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NOTE
Let Me In: The Right of Access to
Business Disputes Conducted in State
Courts
Delaware Coalition for Open Government v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510 (3d Cir. 2013).
DAVID W. BROWN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Arbitrations are popular in business disputes, and Delaware is a haven for
businesses.1 The Delaware legislature, in an attempt to make the state even
friendlier to businesses, enacted laws that allowed them to use the court system as
an arbitration venue away from the prying eyes of the public and press. 2 In an
attempt to protect First Amendment right of access to judicial proceedings, the
Delaware Coalition for Open Government brought suit against the judges who
were overseeing the arbitrations. 3 In Delaware Coalition for Open Government v.
Strine, the Third Circuit held that the public has a right to access these proceedings and that statutes barring public access are unconstitutional. 4 This decision is
the subject of this note.
After examining the history of the First Amendment right of access to civil
proceedings, this note will analyze how the two-pronged historical test applies to
arbitrations conducted in a state court. 5 The prongs of the test — experience and
logic — provide the framework for the analysis conducted in this note. 6 This note
argues the analysis conducted in Strine was the correct approach, and suggests the
implementation of Sunshine Laws similar to those in other states as a constitutionally permissible alternative that would satisfy the holding in Strine.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This case concerns a suit brought by the Delaware Coalition for Open Government (the Coalition) against the defendant judges of the Delaware Court of
* B.S., Truman State University, 2013; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law,
2016; Journal of Dispute Resolution, Lead Articles Editor, 2015-16. I would like to thank Professor
Douglas Abrams for his helpful insight while writing this Note. I would also like to thank the staff of
the Journal of Dispute Resolution, who edited this Note, for the significant time and effort they dedicated throughout the entire process.
1. LEWIS S. BLACK, JR., WHY CORPORATIONS CHOOSE DELAWARE 1 (2007), available at
http://corp.delaware.gov/whycorporations_web.pdf.
2. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 512 (3d Cir. 2013).
3. Id.
4. Id. at 521.
5. Id. at 514.
6. Id.
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Chancery.7 The Coalition is a non-profit corporation “dedicated to promoting and
defending the people’s right to transparency and accountability in government.” 8
All defendants in the action were judges of the Court of Chancery whom the Coalition claimed violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution
when they served as arbitrators in confidential arbitrations conducted in the court.9
In 2009, Delaware added a provision to the state code that expanded the power of the Court of Chancery to arbitrate business disputes. 10 To qualify for this
arbitration, at least one party must be a business formed or organized under Delaware law,11 and neither party can be a consumer. 12 The court’s power to arbitrate
is limited to disputes in which the amount in controversy is at least one million
dollars.13
The Coalition argued this practice of confidential court proceedings violated a
First Amendment right held by the press and the public to access civil trials. 14
The Coalition’s claim rested on the assertion that the First Amendment contains a
presumptive right of access to judicial proceedings. 15 Defendants argued that the
proceedings at issue are not similar to civil trials, and that the Delaware practices
should therefore be upheld. 16 The United States District Court in Delaware granted the Coalition’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling the Delaware
proceedings were essentially civil trials, to which the public has a right of access.17
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court and held that when a state conducts arbitration proceedings
through its court system the proceedings are similar to civil trials, and when
viewed through the Supreme Court tests of “experience” and “logic” the public
has a First Amendment right of access to such proceedings. 18

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The analysis in the instant case focuses on Title 10 Section 349 of the Delaware Code and its constitutionality under the First Amendment of the United
States Constitution.19 This section will present the Delaware rules at issue in
Strine as well as the history of judicial interpretation of the First Amendment as a
7. Complaint at 1, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 894 F. Supp. 2d 493 (D. Del. 2012) (No.
1:11–1015).
8. Id. See also About DelCOG, DELCOG.ORG, www.delcog.org/about (last visited May 19, 2015)
(explaining that the Coalition is a state branch of the National Freedom of Information Coalition whose
goal is “promoting and defending the people’s right to transparency and accountability in government”).
9. Complaint, supra note 7, at 1.
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349 (West 2009).
11. Id. at § 347(a)(3).
12. Id. at § 2731 (defining consumer as “an individual who purchases or leases merchandise primarily for personal, family or household purposes”).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 347(a)(5).
14. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 513 (3d Cir. 2013) (the case at issue was
brought in federal court as it raises a claim under the United States Constitution).
15. Complaint, supra note 7, at 4.
16. Strine, 733 F.3d at 513.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 521.
19. Id. at 513.
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right held by the public to access court proceedings. This section will also present
a case from a California court of appeals regarding judicial arbitration in that state
where a similar holding was reached.

A. The Delaware Rule
The Delaware Chancery Court Rules state that after parties agree to arbitration, a Chancery Court arbitration proceeding can begin. 20 The Chancery Court
judge has authority to order a remedy he or she deems just and equitable as long
as the order is within the scope of the parties’ agreement. 21 The judge’s award
automatically becomes an order of the Court of Chancery. 22 The arbitration proceedings are considered confidential and are made public only when an aggrieved
party appeals the Court of Chancery opinion to the Supreme Court of Delaware. 23
Only parties and their representatives may attend the arbitration proceedings, unless the parties agree otherwise.24 All materials and communications remain confidential except in two circumstances: when the parties agree to waive confidentiality, or when the confidential materials are subject to discovery and were not
prepared specifically for the arbitration hearing. 25

B. First Amendment Right of Access
In Publicker Industries, Inc. v. Cohen, the Third Circuit held that the press
and the public maintain a constitutional and common law right of access to civil
proceedings.26 The actions stemmed from defendant Cohen’s attempt to buy a
large amount of stock and gain a controlling share of Publicker.27 Publicker filed
suit alleging Cohen had failed to make required disclosures in his attempt to purchase the stock.28 Publicker also moved for a temporary restraining order to stop
Cohen from soliciting and using proxies at the upcoming shareholders meeting.29
At the hearing on the motion, it was first mentioned that if specified information
were released concerning some of Publicker’s business operations at the upcoming shareholder’s meeting, Publicker could suffer adverse effects. 30 Cohen requested the court require Publicker to disclose the information or postpone the

20. DEL. CH. CT. R. 97(b) (West 2010).
21. Id. at 98(f)(1).
22. Id. at 98(f)(3).
23. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 349(b) (West 2009).
24. DEL. CH. CT. R. 98(b) (West 2010).
25. Id.
26. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1061 (3d Cir. 1984).
27. Id. at 1062 (Cohen, defendant in the action, sought to take control of Publicker Industries by
agreeing to buy a large amount of stock from a member of the Neuman family, who owned 37% of the
stock in the company. Cohen had also made an agreement with some members of the family to vote
for them via proxy at the next shareholders meeting. A member of the Neuman family who Cohen had
not agreed with filed a separate suit alleging the agreement with the other Neuman family members
violated a Pennsylvania law barring a shareholder from selling his or her voting rights or proxy. A
judge set aside the stock purchase agreement for being “without legal foundation”).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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meeting until it did so. 31 The court held another hearing in open court to consider
the opposing motions.32
With a member of the media present in the courtroom, Publicker requested
the judge close the proceedings except to necessary parties, stating the hearing’s
purpose was to determine whether specified information should remain confidential.33 The court granted the request to close the proceedings, stating that the
press’s presence destroyed the entire function of the hearing. 34 Throughout the
day, several other news sources attempted to gain access to the hearings, but were
denied for the same reason as the first. 35 The trial court found an “over-riding
interest” in maintaining the confidentiality of the proceedings and admitting the
press would essentially decide the case because the issue before the judge was
confidentiality of information.36
Two entities that were denied access to the proceedings — Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. (PNI) and Dow Jones — appealed to the Third Circuit.37 In
deciding whether the parties had a right of access to civil trials, the court of appeals considered both a common law right and a First Amendment right. 38 The
panel in Publicker cited Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale39 to determine whether
the right of access was applicable in civil proceedings. In Gannett, the Supreme
Court held a defendant’s right to a public trial is “equally applicable to civil and
criminal cases.”40 Gannett also recited the common law assumption that the public has a right to attend trials, civil and criminal trials alike. 41 Therefore, the court
in Publicker held that PNI and Dow Jones had a common law right of access to
civil trials.42
After establishing a common law right, the Third Circuit considered whether
the Appellants PNI and Dow Jones had a First Amendment right of access to civil
trials.43 Again, the court of appeals began by analyzing criminal trials. 44 The
panel cited Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, in which the United States
Supreme Court held the First Amendment guarantees a right of access to criminal
trials.45 The Richmond majority held the function of the First Amendment ensures
“freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government,” and court proceedings are a central function of the government. 46 Richmond also held the First Amendment includes a right of access traditionally open
to the public to exercise other First Amendment rights. 47 The Supreme Court
stated the courtroom has historically been open to the public and the media, and
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1062.
Id. at 1063.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1064.
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1066.
443 U.S. 368 (1979).
Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979).
Id. at 385.
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1067.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980)).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 578.
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their presence assures judicial proceedings possess “integrity.” 48 Therefore, the
court held the public had a right of access to criminal trials, but did not decide on
the issue of public access to civil trials. 49
In Publicker, the Third Circuit had to decide whether Richmond’s analysis
and rights concerning criminal trials was applicable to civil proceedings. 50 To
decide this, the court of appeals analyzed two principles from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court: whether there is a
presumption of openness in civil trials and whether that openness plays a significant role in the judicial process and government. 51
In considering the presumption of openness, the Third Circuit in Publicker
found a presumption of openness in the American court system could be traced
back to English law where all trials were to be held in open court for the public to
access.52 The court of appeals stated that access to court proceedings is “inherent
in the nature of our democratic form of government.” 53 The court further cited
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who said public access to civil proceedings was
central because it helped secure the “proper administration of justice,”54 and that
“it is of the highest moment that those who administer justice should always act
under the sense of public responsibility, and that every citizen should be able to
satisfy himself with his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is performed.”55
In deciding Publicker the Third Circuit held the advantages present in the
openness of criminal trials as stated by the Supreme Court in Globe Newspaper
are also present in civil trials.56 In Globe Newspaper, the Supreme Court found
the advantages of open civil proceedings included an appearance of fairness,
which allows public participation to insure the proper administering of justice, and
an increased public respect and education for the judicial system. 57
Globe Newspaper stands for the proposition that while there is a First
Amendment right of access, that right is not absolute. 58 To overcome the presumption of access it must be shown that there is an important government interest and there is no less restrictive way to protect that interest.59 The presumption
of openness can also be overcome where a party to a proceeding can show a
“clearly defined and serious injury with specificity.” 60
After finding a First Amendment right of access to civil trials and a presumption of openness, the Supreme Court in Publicker laid out the procedural and sub-

48. Id.
49. Id. at 580.
50. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1068.
51. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper Co., v. Super. Ct. for Norfolk Cnty., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982)).
52. Id. (citing EDWARD JENCKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 73–74 (6th ed. 1967); Daubney v.
Cooper, (1829) 109 Eng. Rep. 438, (K.B.); 10 B. & C. 237, 240).
53. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1069 (citing United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1256 (D.C. Cir.
1976)).
54. Id. (quoting Cowley v. Pulsifier, 137 Mass. 392, 394 (1884)).
55. Id.
56. Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 607).
60. Id. at 1070-71 (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 890
(E.D. Pa. 1981)).
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stantive requirements for denying access to civil proceedings. 61 Procedurally, a
court denying access must identify the interest it is attempting to protect and must
sufficiently articulate those findings so that a reviewing court can determine if the
denial of access was proper.62 To satisfy the substantive requirement, a court must
find “an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve
higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” 63
Applying these standards in Publicker, the Third Circuit held the district court
satisfied the procedural requirement in closing the proceedings, but failed to satisfy the substantive requirement.64 The court said the district court abused its discretion in considering Publicker’s preliminary injunction motion at the same
closed proceeding in which it considered the closing of confidential information. 65
The district court made no note of a confidentiality interest or alternatives to closing the portion regarding the injunction motion, therefore failing to meet the closure requirements.66
These precedents led the Supreme Court to establish a test, enunciated in
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California.67 In Press, the Court considered a case in which members of the press were denied access to the transcripts
of a preliminary hearing of a criminal prosecution and sued the court overseeing
the proceedings.68 The Court noted this was a First Amendment right of access
issue and dismissed the defense’s argument that the right applied only to trials. 69
The Court stated a two-part test to identify whether a person has a First Amendment right of access.70 First, a court must consider whether both the place and the
type of proceeding have historically been accessible by the public. 71 Second, it
must be considered whether access by the public plays a significant and positive
role in the proceeding.72 The Court labeled these the tests of “experience and
logic.”73 In Press, the Court found both tests were satisfied, and held the denial of
access to the preliminary hearing transcripts was a violation of the First Amendment right of access.74
Applying similar law, a California court decided against the allowance of private judge-ran arbitrations.75 Heenan involved a superior court judge who conducted a private arbitration between two parties.76 Plaintiffs in the case hired the
defendant as a general contractor and later sued claiming defective work. 77 Defendant countersued for unpaid fees. 78 The parties agreed, after court encourage61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1070, 1071.
Id. at 1071 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 478 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1986)).
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1071 (citing Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 9-10)).
Publicker, 733 F.2d at 1072-74.
Id. at 1072.
Id.
478 U.S. 1 (1986).
Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal. 478 U.S. 1, 4 (1986).
Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 9.
Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13-14.
Heenan v. Sobati, 96 Cal. App. 4th 995 (2002).
Id.
Id. at 998.
Id.
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ment, to partake in arbitration before a sitting superior court judge. 79 The court
labeled the action a “judicial binding arbitration” which resulted in the judge mailing an award decision in favor of Plaintiffs.80 This award was not filed in the
court, so Plaintiffs then had to file an order to enforce the award, which was then
appealed, leading to the analysis by the Court of Appeals. 81
Prior to Heenan, California law permitted binding judicial arbitration.82 The
Court of Appeals stated contractual arbitration must take place outside the courts
and the only judicial involvement should be the enforcement of an award. 83 The
court cited precedent that addressed many of the same policy concerns the Third
Circuit did through precedent in Strine, stating that judging must be done in view
of the public with appropriate appellate review to satisfy the appearance of justice.84 Therefore, the appeals court ruled the orders and procedures invalid.85
This precedent, specifically the tests of experience and logic used to decide
First Amendment access cases, guided the Third Circuit’s decision in Strine.

IV. INSTANT DECISION
In deciding the case at hand, the Third Circuit applied the experience and logic test, as described in Press, to determine if a First Amendment right of access
existed.86 The court of appeals for the Third Circuit further reiterated precedent
by stating that in order for a proceeding to qualify for public access, the tests of
experience and logic must be satisfied, 87 and if they were satisfied, only a compelling government interest could override them. 88 After acknowledging this formula
as the appropriate test, the court ultimately found the district court did not apply
the formula89 and the decision was therefore overturned. 90

A. Experience: History of Arbitration
The Third Circuit began its analysis with the “experience” prong of the Press
test.91 Noting the parties disagreed over what history was relevant,92 the court of
appeals decided on a broad historical approach that reaches both civil trials and
arbitrations.93 Citing Publicker, the panel explained the history of access to civil
trials as well as the courthouse itself. 94 Further, the court found the tradition of
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Heenan, 96 Cal. App. 4th at 998.
82. Id. at 1000.
83. Id. at 1001.
84. Id. at 1002 (citing TJX Cos., Inc. v. Super. Ct., 87 Cal. App. 4th 747, 754 (2001)).
85. Id. at 1004.
86. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 514 (3d Cir. 2013).
87. Id. (citing N.J. Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 213-14 (3d Cir. 2002)).
88. Strine, 733 F.3d at 514 (citing Press-Enter. Co. v. Sup. Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 511 (1984)).
89. Id. at 514.
90. Id. at 515.
91. Id.
92. Id. (the judges argued only the history of arbitrations should be used while the Coalition argued
only the history of civil trials should be used in the experience analysis).
93. Id. at 516.
94. Strine, 733 F.3d at 516 (citing Publicker Ind., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1068-70 (3d Cir.
1984)).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2015

7

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2015, Iss. 1 [2015], Art. 13

214

JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2015

access stems from English law and continues in the American legal tradition;
therefore, the court concluded the experience prong pointed toward openness
when considering civil trials.95
The court devoted more time to the history of arbitrations for its “experience”
analysis.96 The court noted the prevalence of arbitration throughout history, and
concluded early arbitrations in England were held in public venues and involved
the community.97 In America, arbitrations allowed parties skeptical of the established legal system to resolve disputes privately. 98 As arbitrations became more
common because of the ever-increasing amount of business in America, members
of the judiciary began overseeing arbitrations outside of their official roles as
judges.99 After the passage of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, courts treated
arbitrations as binding contracts, allowing arbitration to become much more useful
to parties.100
The court found that in modern times a member of an organization whose
sole function is conducting arbitrations are often the ones who organize arbitration
in the first place.101 The court noted a distinction between modern arbitrations and
the way they were historically conducted — finding that now arbitrations are entirely private unless the parties agree to open proceedings.102
Next, the court noted conflict in the public nature of arbitrations throughout
history, but also stated they have often been closed in more modern times. 103
Further, the court said this closure is part of the nature of arbitrations because they
serve as a private alternative to traditional court proceedings. 104 Considering the
history of both civil trials and arbitrations together, the court recognized a contrast: civil trials have historically been open, but arbitrations not conducted by the
state are often closed to the public.105 With that history in mind, the court noted
the Delaware proceedings at issue shared many characteristics with traditional
arbitrations, including “informality, flexibility, and limited review.” 106 However,
the court found the proceedings to differ from other arbitrations because the result
of these arbitrations is a binding court order and because there is only a limited
right to appeal.107
In concluding its analysis of experience, the court stated the right of access to
arbitrations conducted by courts is “deeply rooted in the way the judiciary functions in a democratic society,” and stated Publicker’s historical analysis was simi95. Id. (citing Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due
Process, and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 311, 318-19 (2012)).
96. Id. at 516.
97. Id. at 517 (citing Edward Powell, Settlement of Disputes by Arbitration in Fifteenth-Century
England, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 21, 29, 33-34 (1984)).
98. Id. at 517 (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WITHOUT LAW?: RESOLVING DISPUTES
WITHOUT LAWYERS 4 (1983)).
99. Id. at 517 (citing Bruce H. Mann, The Formalization of Informal Law: Arbitration Before the
American Revolution, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443, 475 (1984)).
100. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517 (citing IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT VOL. 1, § 4.1.2
(1999)).
101. Id. at 517.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 518.
104. Id. at 517.
105. Id.
106. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517.
107. Id.
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lar.108 The court found the experience prong favored public access to arbitral
proceedings because the place and type of proceeding have traditionally been
open to the public.109

B. Logic
The Third Circuit also analyzed the logic prong of the Press test.110 Under
this prong, the court examined whether the public’s access plays a significant
positive role in these particular proceedings.111 The court presented six potential
benefits that have been previously ascribed as benefits to open proceedings:
(1) promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing the public with the more complete understanding of the [proceeding];
(2) promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved
only by permitting full public view of the proceedings;
(3) providing a significant community therapeutic value as an outlet for
community concern, hostility and emotion;
(4) serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the [proceeding]
to public scrutiny;
(5) enhancement of the performance of all involved; and
(6) discouragement of [fraud].112
The court found all of these goals could be reached through open proceedings.113 Acknowledging the significant benefits of an open process, the court also
found potential drawbacks as argued by the defendant judges was relatively minor.114 The court first looked to the judges’ argument that the closed proceedings
protect confidential information, such as trade secrets, that may then end up being
shared by businesses.115 The court dismissed this argument, finding those types of
sensitive information to be already protected by the Chancery Court Rules. 116
Addressing the second argument made by the judges, who stated confidentiality protected companies involved in arbitration from “loss of prestige and goodwill,”117 the court found that while this loss may be “unpleasant” for the parties, it
does not actually interfere with the proceedings or hinder the public good.118 Exposure to public scrutiny is actually a benefit, not a drawback of open proceedings.119
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517 (quoting PG Publ’g. v. Aichele, 705 F.3d 91, 110-11 (3d Cir. 2013)
(internal brackets in original)).
113. Id. at 517.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. (quoting DEL. CH. CT. R. 5.1 (West 2014) (Rule 5.1 provides for confidential filing of documents that contain trade secrets, financial, business, or personal information)).
117. Id. at 517 (quoting Appellants’ Brief at 60, Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510
(3d Cir. 2013) (No. 12-3859)).
118. Id.
119. Strine, 733 F.3d at 517.
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The final argument made by the defendant judges was that opening the proceedings could actually end Delaware’s arbitration program.120 The court did not
agree, and concluded this point of view assumed the only advantage of arbitration
over regular civil proceedings is arbitration’s privacy. 121 The court however
points out that the judges themselves spent much of their brief attempting to point
out the differences between the two. 122 The court noted several differences, including the fact arbitrations are entered into by consent, they are marked by “procedural flexibility,” and their awards are subject to limited appellate review.123
The court found this logic test prong also favored open proceedings and any
potential drawbacks were not compelling. 124 The court held because there existed
a tradition of accessibility to government-sponsored arbitrations, and because
public access was an integral part of the process, the First Amendment right of
access applies to these arbitrations.125 The Supreme Court of the United States
has denied the writ of certiorari sought by the judges. 126
In a concurring opinion, Judge Julio Fuentes articulated the Third Circuit’s
decision was not a sweeping destruction of Delaware’s arbitration proceedings. 127
Judge Fuentes found because the decision concerned the First Amendment right of
access, the court of appeals struck down only the portions of the Delaware code
and Chancery Court rules invoking private proceedings. 128 Therefore, the majority’s decision did nothing to eliminate Delaware proceedings, and instead opened
them to the press and public.129

C. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Jane Roth wrote a dissenting opinion articulating disagreement with the
majority’s analysis of experience and logic.130 Judge Roth differed regarding
what must be analyzed as part of history — concluding that arbitrations are the
only relevant history.131 This analysis is opposed to that of the majority, which
deemed it relevant to include an analysis of the history of civil trials. 132 After
analyzing the history of arbitrations, Judge Roth concluded arbitrations have been
and continue to be held privately. 133 For the logic prong of the test, she concluded
arbitrations involving private information must remain private so that parties are
not subject to detriment from the information being available to the public and

120. Id. at 520.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 521.
125. Strine, 733 F.3d at 521.
126. Strine v. Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1551 (2014).
127. Strine at 521 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 525-26 (Roth, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 516.
133. Strine, 733 F.3d at 525-26 (citing Richard C. Reuben, Confidentiality in Arbitration: Beyond the
Myth, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1255, 1271-72 (2006); THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPUTES Canon VI(B) (2004), available at https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/
arbitratorsmediators/aboutarbitratorsmediators/codeofethics).
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competitors.134 She therefore concluded there to be no First Amendment right of
access.135
The decision in Strine raises an interesting issue of how far states can go in
overseeing the arbitrations conducted within their borders. Further, as made apparent by the dissenting opinion, there are drastically different ways to employ
and interpret the precedent that is usually relied on in First Amendment access
cases.

V. COMMENT
With the holding in Strine, the Third Circuit established a rule that continues
the historical trend of keeping court proceedings open to the public, and also more
clearly defines what an arbitration can and cannot be. This decision is applicable
to more than one state, but most obviously impacts Delaware where the law originated and possibly implicates that state’s status as a corporate mecca. This section
analyzes the court’s decision in light of the policies the Third Circuit considered,
the merits of the dissent, and discusses possible alternatives to the arbitration program that would not violate the First Amendment right of access.

A. Policy Considerations
Public access to official court proceedings has enjoyed a long and prominent
history in American jurisprudence. That fact held much weight in the majority
decision, and ultimately led to the ruling in Strine.136 Unfortunately for businesses
who desire closed arbitrations, it appears the major draw to Delaware’s arbitration
process was access to a judge behind closed doors, one who also had the power to
hand down binding court awards.137 The benefit this arbitration system offered
over other arbitration programs was private access to a judge with the power of
the court behind him. 138 There are other entities that can provide confidentiality
and still produce a binding agreement. 139 Therefore, this ruling does not significantly harm any potential parties to the court-sponsored arbitration.
Any harm stemming from these secret arbitrations to the parties themselves is
minimal; however, the harm to the public and the court system is potentially vast.
Before this decision was reached, public and press were both being denied access
to the private arbitration proceedings, including filings and dockets they were
entitled to by the First Amendment. The Delaware arbitration program also allowed judges to act without accountability because their decisions were private
and had limited review. As discussed above, First Amendment access is not purely meant for the benefit of the people, but also ensures the accountability of the
courts and government to the citizens. This latter function was not being served
by these Delaware arbitrations. The Third Circuit was faced with the accountabil-

134. THE CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, supra note 133, at 526.
135. Id.
136. See Publicker Ind., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1954).
137. Thomas Stipanowich, In Quest of the Arbitration Trifecta, or Closed Door Litigation?: The
Delaware Arbitration Program, 6 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 349, 369 (2013).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 371.
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ity of a court that was acting out of the public eye without a compelling interest to
do so.
The California case discussed previously, Heenan — is different from Strine
—it involved statutory rules and was applicable in business disputes involving
significant amounts of money. These cases are reconcilable, and the analysis of
the roles of the judge and the court should remain the same. The judge is as an
extension of the state, and as discussed through case law above, is required to
conduct his or her duties in the eye of the public to maintain the rights of the people. Simply because Delaware has an interest in maintaining its allure to corporations does not release it from complying with the First Amendment.

B. Judge Roth’s Dissent
Judge Roth’s dissent announced her disagreement with the majority’s definition of the appropriate history to be considered under the experience prong of the
test. Roth argues only the history of arbitration should have been relevant, while
the majority opinion written by Judge Sloviter considers the history of both arbitration and traditional court proceedings. It seems Judge Roth’s opinion of history
failed to consider what was actually taking place in the courtroom. Her analysis
focuses heavily on the goals of arbitration, rather than the implications of the procedure. To ignore the history of public access to civil proceedings ignores how
crucial the use of the judge and courtroom were to these arbitrations. Disregarding these events led to the conclusion that the history of open arbitrations alone
was applicable and that Delaware’s program was constitutional.
The Strine decision reaches beyond the bounds of what the Supreme Court
has determined in arbitration cases.140 The Delaware arbitration program at issue
was not subject to be barred based on the First Amendment. 141 The history of
criminal trials that the majority based much of the “experience” analysis on is
inapplicable in this case because the history access to arbitrations is not as onesided as that of criminal trials.142 The judges in the Third Circuit majority recognize a “mixed record of openness,”143 but still determined the history was sufficient to require access.144 Ultimately, the Third Circuit might have interpreted the
constitutional right of access too broadly, and in so doing inhibited the ability of
states to enact creative solutions to their specific legal issues. 145

C. A Constitutionally Permissible Alternative
As noted in the concurrence by Judge Fuentes, arbitration through the court
system is not unconstitutional.146 Some room for creativity was left when the
Third Circuit decided this case. Delaware is not barred from having a courtoperated arbitration program, but it is barred from having a confidential arbitration
140. Myron T. Steele & Peter I. Tsoflias, Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum, 77 ALB. L. REV.
1365, 1383 (2014).
141. Id. at 1381.
142. Id. at 1380, 1381.
143. Id. at 1383 (quoting Del. Coal. for Open Gov’t v. Strine, 733 F.3d 510, 518 (3d Cir. 2013)).
144. Steele & Tsoflias, supra note 140 at 1382.
145. Id.
146. Strine, 733 F.3d at 521 (Fuentes, J., concurring).
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system with sitting judges serving as the arbitrators in a courtroom. This distinction allows Delaware to create an alternative program still capable of achieving
the possible advantages of the program that has now been struck down.
One option would be for Delaware to set up an arbitration program with former Chancery Court judges as the arbitrators. The individuals would be familiar
with applicable law and have experience handling business disputes; therefore,
they would be able to reach a logical conclusion supported by law. Given these
are not sitting judges serving as arbitrators, the courtroom would no longer serve
as the venue, and arbitrations would ultimately be confidential. Such an approach
solves the court’s confidentiality issue, and a court could later compel the arbitration order if one party does not cooperate in disposition. If confidentiality is the
key issue, then that problem becomes solved.
California employs such a system, labeled “judicial arbitration.”147 Under
this system, arbitrators include retired judges, members of the state bar, or even
current judges as long as they are not compensated for their time. 148 Regardless of
party consent, a court can order these arbitrations, 149 and if a party to the arbitration does not request a trial de novo or request a dismissal, the award is considered
a judgment with the same effect as any other civil proceeding. 150
Arizona law establishes a similar arbitration system 151 to the California system, and the program has led to a high amount of satisfaction from those who
have participated.152 Almost all of the lawyers polled (93%) who had represented
clients in the arbitration program felt they were able to “fully present their case” 153
while 82% felt the arbitration was fair.154 However, the results from the survey
were not all positive. Just over half of the attorneys felt the arbitrators understood
the issues involved in the case and only 50% thought the arbitrator was “very
knowledgeable about arbitration procedures.”155 Strikingly, only one-third of the
arbitrators polled were “very familiar” with the law in the cases they oversaw. 156
However, most of the arbitrators felt they had enough information to appropriately
decide the matter.157 One important note is the arbitrators who reported being
more familiar with pertinent law were more likely to report having enough relevant information to make an informed decision in the case. 158
This data from Arizona reveals a high level of satisfaction among arbitration
participants, but also sheds light on a potential limitation to such programs. It
appears from the data that arbitrator knowledge of pertinent law is vital in perception of the validity of the arbitrations. As suggested above, a similar rule as that in
California where retired judges or judges not serving in their official capacity
147. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.10 (West 2004).
148. Id. at § 1141.18.
149. Mercury Ins. Grp. v. Super. Ct. of San Bernadino Cnty., 965 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1998).
150. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1141.23 (West 2004).
151. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-133 (West 2012).
152. Rosselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Court-Connected Arbitration in the Superior Court of Arizona: A Study of Its Performance and Proposed Rule Changes, 2007 J. DISP. RESOL. 65, 86-93 (authors conducted a survey in 2004 where all members of the Arizona state bar were invited to answer
questions regarding their experiences with the arbitration program in place).
153. Id. at 85.
154. Id. at 85, 86.
155. Id. at 86.
156. Id. at 87.
157. Id.
158. Wissler & Dauber, supra note 152, at 87.
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could serve as arbitrators could help alleviate some of the issues presented in the
Arizona research.
A program such as those employed in California and Arizona could work
well as an alternative to the unconstitutional Delaware program. The arbitration
would be conducted confidentially and would result in an order from the Court,
binding the parties. This outcome was a main advantage of the Delaware arbitrations. A case could come before the Court of Chancery, and while the California
and Arizona programs differ in that they do not require consent, if both parties
request arbitration, one could be ordered and then handled outside of the courtroom for the remainder of the proceedings. Many of the surrounding rules designated for the Court of Chancery arbitrations could stand, including amount in
controversy and commercial party requirements.

VI. CONCLUSION
For many years, Delaware has been a state creating pro-business legislation
that welcomes corporations, and as a result, a Chancery Court system knowledgeable in business law emerged. Recently, with the creation of an arbitration program with sitting judges as the arbitrators, Delaware maintained that reputation.
In so doing, a system was created that violated a provision of the First Amendment that serves both the public and the courts.
Arbitrations are inherently confidential. Court proceedings are inherently
open. The experiment conducted by Delaware attempting to combine those two
conflicting interests failed, when the Third Circuit added to precedent favoring
open court proceedings in Strine. This decision does not in any way negate the
advantages of arbitration, and does not seriously harm Delaware as a hub for business. Delaware was a desirable state for businesses before 2009 when the legislation was passed159 and will likely continue to be. Courts and parties prefer arbitration over litigation for a variety of reasons, but the arguments put forward were
insufficient to overcome the First Amendment right of access.

159. BLACK, supra note 1.
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